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Abstract 
While European integration has gained momentum following the Treaty of 
Maastricht, a discourse on “Europe of the regions” has come to the fore, with the 
presumption that the sub-national units become, or are supposed to become, active 
dynamics of the integration process. However, this dominant discourse seems to take 
the “actorness” of sub-national units for granted, without questioning their rather 
passive position in the face of both national and supranational actors. In turn, this 
passive position gives rise to a reaction – albeit in some cases reluctantly – from the 
part of sub-national units. As a matter of fact, the research on which the present paper 
is based suggests that while their involvement in interaction at both national and supra-
national levels varies from country to country, and even from one region to another 
within any given member state, these units tend to “individualize” for certain reasons. 
Among others, the main factors of individualization are ever-growing competition and 
devolution of not only competences, but also public finance burdens which forces the 
sub-national units to act increasingly in individual terms. The paper aims to share some 
observations on the transformation of these units, focusing on the case of Italy. 
Keywords: European integration, multi-level system, regionalization, sub-national 
units. 
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One of the most striking aspects of the European Integration is the fact that 
the rapidly-changing political structure of the integration process implies and 
even requires changes in the internal structures of member states. It is also 
observed that member states’ reactions in the face of this challenge differ to a 
great extent among each other. Nevertheless, the main trend seems to remain 
the same; i.e. almost all of the members of the EU-15 have undergone a certain 
process of transformation characterized by devolution, decentralization and 
even federalization. In this study, this trend is preferred to refer as 
“regionalization”, since its conceptual scope ranges from simple technical 
reforms in favor of devolution to some radical movements of regionalism. 
The process of regionalization implies a certain interaction between 
different layers of integration, namely local/regional, national and 
supranational. Although, the impact of European Integration on regionalization 
is quite obvious, nature of interaction between these layers seem to require 
further study. The main purpose of this paper is to share some observations on 
the changing nature of these layers – particularly those at sub-national level – 
focusing primarily on the case of Italy. However, the comparative approach 
adopted throughout the study is expected to shed light on the overall features of 
the regionalization process in the European integration.   
2. Theoretical Background 
In spite of its effects on inter-governmentalize, it is observed that the main 
premises of international relations theory are not sufficiently integrated into the 
context of European integration [1]. Although multifaceted structure of the 
European integration requires “multiple models” [2], some scholars argue that 
in order not to lose the holistic perspective the gaps between these 
models/approaches should be bridged [1]. Besides, the difficulty in clearly 
distinguishing between the supranational and intergovernmental dynamics of 
the European integration [3] also implies the necessity of bridging the 
theoretical gap between the multilevel-governance based approaches and those 
based on international relations theory. Although “bridge-building” [1] is far 
beyond the scope of this study, assessing the basic premises of multi-level 
governance by means of an actor-based analysis is expected to be helpful for 
further research. 





As a matter of fact, actor-based approaches that take into consideration the 
position of newly emerging sub-national units in relation to other levels, 
especially to the supranational one seem to be quite scarce.  This scarcity 
becomes particularly dramatic in the face of the dominant discourse on “Europe 
of the regions” according to which sub-national units become – or should 
become – active dynamics of the integration process. It seems that this approach 
take the “actorness” of sub-national units for granted, without questioning their 
rather passive position in the face of both national and supranational actors. As 
a sort of extension of this discourse in theoretical field, multi-level governance 
approach also implies effective interaction between various politico-
administrative levels, namely national, supranational and sub-national.  
However, the fact that participation of sub-national units in multi-level 
policy areas is triggered and maintained by top-down dynamics originating 
mainly from supranational and to a certain extent national level led some 
scholars to question the efficiency of multi-level governance approach [4]. 
Besides, given that even the relationships between the key institutions of the EU 
itself are still in a state of flux, the multi-level policy-making environment 
seems even more unpredictable [2] and thus, open to discussion. This setting 
reaffirms the necessity of actor based analyses focusing on the circumstances 
and factors that give rise to the emergence of sub-national units.  
Departing from this setting, the main question tackled throughout the 
research on which this paper is based was: “how might the classical IR theory 
work in a multi-level environment, with particular respect to the newly 
emerging actors that are supposed to behave in line with their own interests?”. 
Although the research has focused on Italian experience of 
regionalization/federalization, the comparative approach adopted throughout the 
study is expected to shed light on the overall features of the regionalization 
process in the European integration. As regards the theoretical tools, some 
variables offered by Jeffery as indicators of “actorness” were taken into 
consideration, such as constitutional background, existence of mechanisms 
allowing sub-national units direct access to the supranational platforms and 
their ability of entrepreneurship [4]. Therefore, after having located the Italian 
case in European context, the regionalization process will be summarized below 
with particular reference to these variables. 
3. Italian Case in European Context 
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Being re-organized as an ever-transforming “regional state” [5]  following 
the end of the World War II and being the first Western European state to start 
the regionalization process, Italy seems as one of the most useful cases offering 
insights into the nature of regionalization in European integration [6]. 
Furthermore, given the fact that Italian regionalization gained momentum from 
the second half of the 90s onwards leading into a “federalizing process” [7] 
parallels to a great extent deepening of the EU from the same period onwards. 
As a result of these basic traits, Italy has been referred to as “geopolitics 
laboratory of Europe” [8]. 
Although the most decisive phase of regionalization in Italy has started with 
the so-called “second republic”, its roots are traced back to the formation of 
Italian Republic following the World War II and even before. As a matter of 
fact, given the highly fragmented geo-political structure of the peninsula prior 
to national unification, a federal political organization had always been on the 
agenda [9]. Following the unification under Piemontese leadership, the choice 
however was made in favor of unitary state. From then on, 
federalism/regionalism has almost always been a moot point. To quote from 
Stemmermann, as a result of the fact that pre-unification Italy’s funeral was not 
made in accordance with necessary rituals, federalism has been haunting the 
peninsula since then [10]. This argument, which at first sight seems to 
differentiate Italy from other Western European states in fact reaffirms the 
country’s special position as far as the European federalism is concerned. 
Because territorial frag mentality, roots of which are traced back to the fall of 
Western Roman Empire and which was at the highest degree in Italy, had 
always been a common trait in Western Europe. Although differed from each 
other, each Western European state had a certain degree of territorial frag 
mentality and national unification procedures brought along elimination of this 
phenomenon. In consequence, modernization became synonymous with 
elimination of regional differences [11]; regardless of their formal political 
structure, almost all Western European states opted for standardization and so 
did Italy. For this very reason, since as far back as the early modern period, 
there have always been federalist tendencies in Italy, aiming not only at the 
unification of peninsula, but also at wider European unity [9]. Needless to say, 
these tendencies were on the high during the early post-war period [9]. When 
Italian Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1947, it was 
partly because of these Europe-wide federalist tendencies that Italy was 





remodeled as a regional state. Thus, just like the parallelism between post-
Maastricht process and the regionalization wave of the second republic, it was 
not a coincidence that Italy’s reorganization as a regional state was 
corresponding to the very beginning of the European integration, idealized by 
founding fathers in line with federal ideas [9]. It was still not a coincidence that 
the leading figures of Italian federalism from Cattaneo to Spinelli [12] were also 
in favor of federal Europe. Thus, while the last phase of 
regionalization/federalization in Italy manifestly reflects the European 
dimension, a closer look to its early phases also suggests the relevance of wider 
European context. 
At this point, an observation seems to support the paradoxical feature of 
federalism in both European and Italian contexts. Accordingly, both faces of 
federalism were characterized primarily by an elite-led approach and it can 
hardly be argued that they reflected the federalist aspirations stemming from 
grassroots. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the Republic, Italy had 
already become a highly unified political entity and the process of socio-
economic integration went on throughout the republican period by means of 
transportation facilities, diffusion of mass media and internal migration from 
South to North [9]. In other words, while legislator was opting for regional 
restructuring of the country, national integration was also going on, and 
paradoxically the most decisive wave of regionalization has started when the 
country reached the highest level of social, cultural and linguistic 
standardization [13]. It is true that at the beginning of the First Republic, there 
were autonomist, irredentist and even separatist movements in bordering 
regions such as Val d’Aosta [14] and Trentino-Alto Adige (Südtirol – South 
Tyrol) [15], based mainly on ethno-linguistic divergence, but compared to the 
rest of the country, their part could easily be classified as negligible. 
Autonomist tendencies were existent also in the islands, particularly in Sicily, 
due to the role of local elites. In fact, the two major islands even adopted their 
own special status prior to the adoption of Italian Constitution, which were 
recognized afterwards by the Constituent Assembly [16]. It is worth attention 
that following the founding of the republic, autonomist tendencies in the islands 
disappeared almost totally, due to local elites’ integration into the central 
administration, central administration’s protective approach and economically 
harmonizing efforts towards mezzogiorno.  
In a way, these seemingly negligible centrifugal tendencies during the 
founding of Italian republic have ironically crucial effects on the formation of 
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regional administrative structure in post-war Italy. In this context, it is argued 
that besides euro-federalist tendencies, post-fascist democratization efforts and 
weakness of the newly reorganized central government, balancing the 
centrifugal tendencies of peripheral regions – especially those, which  ethnically 
differ from the rest of Italy –  played crucial part in the decision of post-war 
restructuring of the country [16].  
4.  Milestones of Italian Regionalization 
Consequently, while five regions were given special status (statuto 
speciale), creation of other 15 regions with ordinary status was foreseen by the 
Constitution. Each region was structured by means of a Regional Council as 
regional legislative organ to be organized by regional election and a regional 
government (giunta regionale).  However, it was again due to the lack of 
efficient bottom-up dynamics and political consensus that although legally 
established by the 1947 Constitution, realization of the regional politico-
administrative structure took place as late as 1972.  
No matter which of the above-stated reasons were more effective on 
Constituent Assembly’s preferences, following points seem to be clear: 
• Just like the last phase of Italian regionalization, which paralleled the 
post-Maastricht period, also its initial phases have to do with the wider 
European context; 
• Except for a few peripheral regions, there was no grassroots claim in 
favor of regionalism/federalism. 
Regional councils of the 15 ordinary regions were elected in 1970 and each 
council drafted its own status in the following year, which by some is referred 
to as a sort of regional constitution [17]. Thus, “regional state” which was 
foreseen by the Constitution has come into force from 1972 onwards. However, 
in spite of all hopes and enthusiasm, lack of expertise, experience and regional 
government tradition led some scholars to question the efficiency of these new 
units [16]. Besides, there was a lack of interest from the part of people [9]. 
Although a certain process of devolution took place by means of several decrees 
throughout the seventies, it can hardly be argued that the regional level of 
government had started to fully function as foreseen by the Constituent 
Assembly. However, throughout the same period, a certain politico-
administrative class has emerged at regional level, which seems to form the 





very basis of emerging “actorness” [18]. However, a caveat should be made at 
this point that the newly emerging regional elite were basically bureaucratic in 
nature and far from being formed by grassroots dynamics.  
The most decisive phase of Italian regionalization started at the second half 
of the 90s, following the internal political crisis which led to the collapse of 
political system and referred to as the end of the “first republic” [19]. During 
this period the so-called Bassanini Laws, named after the then finance minister 
Franco Bassanini introduced an extensive process of devolution aiming at 
relieving the central government of its bureaucratic and financial burdens. As 
stated by their author, Bassanini, the main purpose of these laws, accompanied 
by a vast wave of privatisation, were to “modernise” the state and leave it with 
its “core business” [20]. Some crucial aspects of these laws, which directly 
involve regionalization, are as follows: 
• Subsidiarity was introduced as a means of competence and responsibility 
sharing between different layers of government [21], which is referred to as 
administrative federalism [20].  
• Financing of the services delivered at regional level was devolved to the 
regions, introducing the “fiscal federalism”.  
• In order to facilitate free entrepreneurship, state bureaucracy was 
simplified to a great extent. This process referred to as “delegificazione” 
involves deregulation in a wide range of fields. 
The reform process gained momentum towards the end of 90s. While the 
Constitutional Law nr. 1/1999 introduced the direct election of the head of the 
regional government (giunta regionale), who until then was elected by the 
regional council, and brought several amendments on the adoption of regional 
status, the main turning point came along with the Constitutional Law nr. 
3/2001. Most of the provisions amending the 5th title of the second part of the 
Italian Constitution on organization of regions, provinces and communes had 
already entered into force by means of ordinary laws. Thus in a way, the 
constitutional reform which brought Italy one step further towards federalism 
was mostly codification of the previously adopted provisions at constitutional 
level. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Constitutional Law nr. 3/2001 
brought crucial changes in terms of discourse, reflecting a shift of 
understanding as far as the organization of the state is concerned. This attitude 
is strikingly reflected by the new wording of the article 114 of the Italian 
Constitution on organization of the state. Accordingly, while according to the 
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previous text the republic was divided into (si riparte) regions, provinces and 
communes, the new wording states that the Republic is constituted by 
communes, provinces, metropolitan cities, regions and the state [22]. Thus, the 
state (lo stato) was formulated in a rather narrow sense as the technical 
apparatus corresponding to the central government and one of the components 
of the political system itself. This attitude of the legislator which is referred to 
as the principle of “pariordinazione” (equal order) is interpreted as one of the 
basic features of the Law nr. 3/2001 [7]. In fact some scholars argue that with 
this principle, the Law nr. 3/2001 went far beyond the Bassanini laws as far as 
the “diminishing of the state” is concerned, given that within the context of 
Bassanini laws, the state was still hierarchically above the regions [16].  
Among others, one of the most important provisions of this Law is that it 
acknowledged involvement of the regions in international relations. 
Accordingly, as far as the regions’ relations to the supranational institutions and 
their international trade relations are concerned, central government and the 
regions have parallel (concorrente) competences.  It is also worth mentioning 
that with this constitutional reform, partition of competences between the 
state/central government and sub-national units was refashioned. Accordingly, 
while the competences belonging to regions were enumerated in the previous 
text of the article 117, the new formulation determined the competences of the 
central government, the rest belonging to the sub-national level. However, it 
should be noted that a considerable amount of these fields of competences such 
as customs, monetary policies, and environmental policies had already been 
transferred to supranational level by the time Law nr. 3/2001 was adopted. 
Needless to say some fields of competences are subject to being transferred to 
the supranational level. On the other hand, some crucial fields of competence 
which were already devolved to sub-national level and which were subject to 
deregulation as stated above have been enlarged by means of parallel 
competence principle. For instance, on the issues such as working life and job 
security, both central government and sub-national units have competences.  
Constitutional reform took place in 2001 is interpreted as a certain phase of 
an open ended process, which is referred to as “federalizing process” [23]. As a 
matter of fact, although not directly specified, some crucial components of a 
federal state organization such as a second chamber representing the regions’ 
interests at national level were implied by the Law nr. 3/2001. In other words, 
this law had left some work to be completed later on. Until recently, a draft law 





dealing with the “leftovers” of the law nr. 1/2003 including creation of a 
chamber of regions (senato federale) was on the agenda, however upon its 
approval by the parliament in November 2005 it was brought to referendum in 
July 2006 and declined by the Italian people. 
Although the factors of regionalization, actors involved in the process and 
their impact can be identified to a certain extent from the brief account given so 
far, in order to trace the process with a more analytical perspective, it might be 
helpful to have a closer look at the factors lying behind this process, hoping to 
clarify the role and efficiency of certain actors – especially the sub-national 
ones. As a matter of fact, although the above account on the main stages of 
regionalization in Italy seems to provide the reader with a rough understanding 
of to what extent the regionalization/federalization process progressed in Italy, 
the position of sub-national units themselves are still unclear.  
5. Factors of Italian Regionalization 
The main factors of regionalization in Italy can roughly be divided into two 
main groups, namely internal and external. Given the limited space of this 
paper, these factors will be referred to concisely below, focusing mainly on the 
points relevant to the basic arguments to be developed in the following section. 
5.1 Internal factors 
The main internal factors contributed to the regionalization process in Italy 
can be divided into three groups, namely structural background, political crisis 
following the end of the Cold War and regionalist movements. By “structural”, 
historical and geopolitical factors are intended, which form the background of 
regionalization process in Italy. As stated above, the key concept summarizing 
these factors is “territorial frag mentality”. This phenomenon is common to the 
most of Western Europe but it seems that in Italy its degree was among the 
highest. However, as stated above, throughout the national integration territorial 
frag mentality has been eliminated to a great extent. Thus, it is observed that the 
territorial frag mentality serves rather as a discourse tool for 
regionalization/federalization than as a genuine factor pressing for structural 
change. It seems that instrumental use of territorial frag mentality as centuries-
old local/regional traditions of Europe is also valid in other regionalization 
experiences.  
As a result of a wide range of internal and external factors for its part, crisis 
of the political system in Italy which ended with the collapse of pre-Cold War 
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party system had both triggering and accelerating effects on regionalization. 
The most apparent impact of the crisis is diffusion of the discourse on 
federalism. While at the beginning of nineties federalism mainly supported by 
regionalist parties was a rather marginal – if not totally unacceptable – 
discourse [24], with the so-called second republic and founding of the new party 
system, it has become integral part of the programme of main political parties 
[5]. At this point, it wouldn’t be misleading to argue that from the second half 
of the nineties’ onwards, federalism has started to be perceived as a sort of cure-
all for a wide range of problems. Some argue that creation of regional level as 
an alternative area of politics was a strategy of the central political elite [16], 
which regarded the regional level as an area of maneuver [19]. These second 
group of factors do not seem to be common in the majority of other Western 
European countries experiencing regionalization.  
As regards the regionalist movements, their direct effect on the process 
seems to be highly disputable, given their coalition-based hybrid structure, 
ideological ambiguities [25], lack of sufficient popular support etc.  The case of 
Lega Nord which reflects these traits illustrates this argument to a great extent 
[25]. Although having achieved a success record especially due to electors’ 
reaction against the collapse of central political system and due to the political 
vacuum during the crisis period [26], and although having contributed to the 
introduction of federalism in daily political jargon, Lega Nord could not 
continue its successes in the long run. Ironically, emerged as a marginal 
regionalist party with strong separatist tendencies it has turned into one of the 
system parties. 
These arguments suggest that one should be cautious while qualifying the 
regionalist parties as sub-national actors. As a matter of fact, the case of Italy 
implies that while central political elite have “created” the regional level as, to 
quote from Parker “alternative topography of power” [26] regionalist parties 
utilized the regionalist discourses in an instrumental way so as to play to the 
center and participate in the government coalitions there. According to this 
analysis, in both cases the main concern is to gain power at the center.  
5.2 External factors 
There are two major external factors of regionalization in Italy, which are 
closely interrelated in terms of consequences, and thus do not totally exclude 
each other: globalization and European integration. Given the obvious link 





between structural transformation process brought about by the “new 
economy”, changing production styles and decentralizing trends all over the 
globe [27], it might well be argued that reforms of the nineties brought about by 
Bassanini Laws reflect the impact of globalization on regionalization in Italy. 
But as argued above, these reforms were also direct consequences of post-
Single Act and post-Maastricht Europeanization in Italy, as has been the case 
elsewhere in Western Europe [28]. Given the fact that creation of single market 
brought about the challenge of international competition, entrepreneurship, 
privatization (as horizontal subsidiarity), rationalization of production, 
flexibility and deregulation emerged as the key concepts of a new understanding 
of public administration. Needless to say pressures originating from “Economic 
and Monetary Union” and “Growth and Stability Pact” were also affective in 
emergence of these conditions [29]. Thus, above mentioned effects of 
globalization was felt via European dimension, and while public administration 
were perceived like business administration, newly emerging sub-national units 
started to be regarded as the main bases of economic development and 
competitiveness [30]. Especially competition formed the main impetus of this 
process, along which not only enterprises but also regions found themselves in 
growing competitive pressures both within the country and in the EU. This 
situation is also observed elsewhere in Western Europe, the most striking 
indicator of which is the German transition from cooperative to competitive 
federalism [31]. Needless to say, coping with competitive pressures brought 
about the above mentioned neo-liberal solutions devolving to the sub-national 
units not only competences but also financial burdens of public services 
including the primary ones such as health care. With this approach, referred to 
as “fiscal federalism” newly emerging bureaucratic elites of the sub-national 
units appear to be left to their own devices, being in a situation which requires 
them to act autonomously on behalf of their region. It seems that it is this 
breaking point that these units found themselves in a certain process of 
individualization. 
Needless to say, while central government’s role on regional development 
EU’s was diminishing, EU’s regional policies and structural funds brought 
about new perspectives for the regions, leading them to search for EU funding. 
Consequently, like many other European counterparts, Italian regions started to 
search for direct contact with EU institutions, particularly with the Commission. 
At this stage, lack of sufficient and prompt information flow on European 
programme, funds, calls for tenders and proposals accelerated this process [6]. 
While Committee of the Regions established as a part of the strategy for 
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creating “Europe of the Regions” [32] formed one of the major communication 
channels in regions’ orientation towards Brussels, acting also individually, 
many among them opened liaison offices in EU’s capital. These offices are 
referred to as “mini embassies” [18] or “Para diplomatic” representatives [] with 
a certain enthusiasm and wishful thinking. However, given that their legal 
status, names and organizational structure highly differ from each other, such an 
attitude seems to be quite misleading. As a matter of fact, except for certain 
German Länder, the basic function of these offices is to gather information on 
EU programme, calls for tenders, proposals etc. and lobbying for EU funds 
rather than directly involve into the decision making procedures, or negotiations 
at supranational level [30]. In other words, either individually by means of these 
offices or collectively by through the Committee of the Regions, although 
regions involve into an international environment at supranational level, it can 
hardly be argued that they behave as “international actors” beside national 
representatives. Besides, sub-national units’ collective participation in policy-
making process through official channels seem to be problematic, given the 
highly technical character of the policy areas coordinated as supranational level, 
which in many cases require specific expertise. This situation puts the sub-
national units in a passive position in the face of their supranational 
interlocutors, who due to their technical knowledge are referred to as epistemic 
communities [33]. 
Although further research might be required for a detailed assessment, it 
seems that these conditions are more or less common for other regions in the 
EU. In many cases, created directly due to the requirements of EU regional 
policy sub-national units seem to be exposed to similar conditions, especially 
the process of “actorisation” is concerned.  
6. Conclusions 
The above account of regionalization in Italy, which has considerable 
common points with other relevant experiences in Western Europe seem to 
provoke re-assessment of the discourses such as “sub-national mobilization” 
and “Europe of the regions”. Accordingly, these discourses, which seem to 
reflect wishful thinking, rather than what actually happens on the ground seem 
to be challenged by following premises: 





• Although regionalization has bases deeply rooted in the history of 
Western Europe, it is mainly triggered by Europeanizing and 
globalizing tendencies, rather than bottom-up pressure; 
• Rather than sub-national mobilization, it is central governments’ and 
supranational authorities’ policies that lead the sub-national units into 
individualization/actorisation in an inciting – if not practically 
coercive – manner. Thus, to behave individually seems to become a 
necessity in order to survive the new politico-economic environment 
rather than a choice in itself; 
• Although the leading discourse imply effective participation of sub-
national units’ in the European integration, given the prevalence of 
technique-intensive issues and so-called epistemic communities as 
their interlocutors at supranational level, their position seems a 
fortiori passive. 
Nevertheless, these observations do not imply total lack of sub-national 
dynamics in the process. By the time regionalization gained momentum, a 
certain regional politico-administrative class has emerged. Although peoples’ 
interest in regional structures still seems to be negligible, this flourishing 
regional bureaucracy becomes the core of “actorness”, which is a matter of 
degree determined by a range of variables such as existence of mechanisms 
allowing sub-national units’ direct access to the supranational platforms, their 
ability of entrepreneurship, competitiveness, constitutional background etc. 
Since this “matter of degree” implies a dynamic process in itself, the term 
“actorisation” seems useful to denominate the individualization of sub-national 
units.  
To sum up, although it is far from being clear to what extent the sub-
national actors become real actors at supra-national level, what seems definite is 
the fact that a certain process of “actorisation” takes place. Nevertheless, it still 
remains to be seen whether this externally-initiated process might generate 
genuine actors behaving on their own interests in such a complex environment 
and whether they might be able to transform this environment, rather than being 
transformed by it. 
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